A working reference to how injury claims actually run in New York — written to be useful both to people with a claim and to attorneys handling one. Every proposition cites the statute, rule or decision it comes from.
New York changed substantially in May 2026. The Legislature deleted a serious-injury category that most soft-tissue claims depended on, moved motor-vehicle cases from pure to modified comparative fault, and reordered how a jury decides a case. Everything below reflects the law as amended.
Authority: L. 2026, FY2027 State budget (S.9008-C / A.10008-C, Part EE); Insurance Law §§ 5102(d), 5104; CPLR 1411. Effective May 26, 2026.
New York enacted the most consequential change to motor-vehicle injury litigation in a generation as part of the FY2027 State budget, signed in late May 2026. The amendments took effect May 26, 2026.
The trigger is the date the lawsuit is commenced, not the date of the crash. An older accident filed after the effective date is governed by the new rules. This single detail has decided whether a claim is viable, and it is the first thing to check on any file opened since mid-2026.
Two of the four changes make soft-tissue cases materially harder. The other two change the arithmetic of recovery.
Each topic below is a full treatment with its own citations.
The serious-injury threshold decides whether a New York motor-vehicle claimant may recover pain and suffering at all. In May 2026 the Legislature deleted one of its nine categories — the one most soft-tissue cases relied on.
New York is a no-fault state, but the phrase means something much narrower than most people assume. It does not mean nobody is at fault and it does not mean you cannot sue.
New York was a pure comparative fault state for half a century. Since May 2026 it has run two different rules side by side, and which one applies depends entirely on what kind of case you have.
This is the most valuable rule in New York injury practice and the one defence counsel most often assumes away. A trucking company found one percent at fault can be liable for all of the plaintiff’s non-economic damages.
Proving liability is half a New York case. Finding coverage is the other half, and with statutory minimums unchanged in three decades it is frequently the harder half.
There is no cap on damages in a New York injury case, and no formula either. What the law supplies instead is structure — and three mechanisms that sit between a verdict and a cheque.
Most New York claims are not lost to the limitations period. They are lost to one of the much shorter clocks that runs first.
New York’s court names mislead almost every client. Supreme Court is the general trial court. The highest court is the Court of Appeals. Getting the forum wrong can cost a claim outright.
New York practice uses two different terms for being questioned under oath, and clients routinely receive notice of one while assuming it is the other. The consequences of mishandling them are not the same.
A New York injury case runs through nine recognisable stages. Knowing which one you are in — and what deadline is attached to it — removes most of the uncertainty clients find hardest.
New York expert practice departs sharply from federal practice and from every neighbouring state, in ways that systematically reward the side that understands the timing.
New York protects construction workers more strongly than any neighbouring state, and it does so through the Labor Law rather than ordinary negligence. No state nearby has an equivalent.
An injured worker in New York has two systems available at once, and how they interact — not which one you pick — is what determines the recovery.
Who is liable for a New York City sidewalk is counter-intuitive, and getting it wrong at the start is usually fatal — because the deadline for suing the City is far shorter than for suing an owner.
New York’s wrongful-death statute is old, narrow, and the subject of the longest-running reform fight in the state’s tort law. Families are routinely shocked by what it does not allow.
A child’s claim runs on different rules, and the most dangerous misconception is that the longer deadline means there is no hurry. A school or playground injury is on a 90-day clock.
One crash produces two legally separate claims, and settling the vehicle claim early — often within days, while storage charges accrue — can quietly damage the injury claim.
New York differs from its neighbours on every axis that decides what a case is worth: whether a threshold applies, who sets it, how fault is counted, and how long you have to sue.
Authority: N.Y. Const. art. VI; N.Y.C. Civil Court Act § 202; Uniform District Court Act § 202; Court of Claims Act §§ 8, 9; CPLR 5501, 5601–5602
Despite the name, this is New York’s general trial court, not its highest court — a point that confuses nearly every client. Almost every serious personal-injury case is filed here, in the county where the accident happened or where a party resides.
Handles smaller-value claims arising in the five boroughs, along with a large volume of no-fault reimbursement disputes between medical providers and insurers.
The Long Island counterpart to the New York City Civil Court. Nassau County has a District Court covering the whole county; in Suffolk it sits in the five western towns.
Primarily a criminal court upstate, but it carries limited civil jurisdiction.
Very small civil claims and local matters.
The only court that can hear a damages claim against the State of New York itself — including the Thruway Authority and State University hospitals. A claim against the State does not belong in Supreme Court, and filing it there loses time that cannot be recovered.
The intermediate appellate court, sitting in four Departments. It reviews both the law and, unusually, the size of a damages award. First Department covers Manhattan and the Bronx; Second covers Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, Long Island and the lower Hudson Valley.
New York’s highest court, sitting in Albany with seven judges. It takes a small number of cases and generally reviews questions of law only, not the amount of a verdict.
Authority: CPLR 1411(a), (b); N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.1; 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572h; M.G.L. c. 231 § 85; 12 V.S.A. § 1036
| State | System | Threshold to sue for pain & suffering | Comparative fault | Limitations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| New York | Mandatory no-fault (PIP) for every registered vehicle | Verbal threshold — eight statutory "serious injury" categories; the 90/180-day category was deleted in May 2026 | Split: modified comparative fault (barred above 50%) in article 51 motor-vehicle cases; pure comparative fault everywhere else CPLR 1411(a), (b) | 3 years (2 years for wrongful death) |
| New Jersey | Choice no-fault — the insured selects their tort rights at purchase | Election between the "limitation on lawsuit" (verbal threshold) option and the "no limitation on lawsuit" option, which preserves the full right to sue for a higher premium | Modified comparative fault — recovery barred above 50% N.J.S.A. § 2A:15-5.1 | 2 years |
| Pennsylvania | Choice no-fault | Election between "limited tort", which restricts non-economic recovery to serious injury, and "full tort", which preserves it | Modified comparative fault — recovery barred above 50% 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102 | 2 years |
| Connecticut | Traditional tort — Connecticut repealed its no-fault system | None. There is no statutory injury threshold to clear before suing for pain and suffering | Modified comparative fault — recovery barred above 50% Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572h | 2 years |
| Massachusetts | Mandatory no-fault (PIP) | Monetary threshold — a medical-expense figure, or specified injuries such as fracture or permanent disfigurement, rather than New York’s verbal categories | Modified comparative fault — recovery barred above 50% M.G.L. c. 231 § 85 | 3 years |
| Vermont | Traditional tort | None | Modified comparative fault — recovery barred above 50% 12 V.S.A. § 1036 | 3 years |
The structural divide that matters most to a New York practitioner is the threshold. New York uses a verbal threshold imposed by statute on every claimant. New Jersey and Pennsylvania use a chosen threshold: the insured decided at purchase whether to keep full tort rights, and that election, not a statute, controls what the claim is worth. Connecticut and Vermont impose no threshold at all.
The fault divide now runs the other way. Until May 2026 New York was the outlier for being purely comparative while every neighbouring state barred recovery above 50%. The 2026 amendment moved New York motor-vehicle cases into line with its neighbours, while leaving premises, products, construction and wrongful-death cases purely comparative. New York is now the only state in the region running two different comparative-fault rules side by side.
For a case with multi-state contacts, the combination of Labor Law § 240(1), Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 and the CPLR 1602(6) exception to Article 16 generally makes New York the more favourable forum for a plaintiff, which is why choice of law is worth briefing where New York contacts exist. In Shaw v. Coach a New York court applied the § 1602(6) exemption to a New York plaintiff’s claim arising from a New Jersey accident.
Neighbouring-state entries above state the structural rule with the governing statute cited. Confirm the current text and any recent amendment before relying on them in a filing.
In New York, Supreme Court is the general trial court, established by article VI, § 7 of the State Constitution with unlimited original jurisdiction. The highest court in New York is the Court of Appeals. Almost every serious injury case is filed in Supreme Court in the county where the accident happened or where a party lives.
Longer than almost anyone expects, and the length is driven by the court’s calendar rather than by the lawyers. Discovery alone commonly runs a year or more, summary judgment may be moved up to 120 days after the note of issue under CPLR 3212(a), and heavily congested venues add further time. A case that resolves at mediation moves far faster than one that is tried.
Usually far less than clients fear. Most appearances are conferences attended by the lawyers alone. The proceedings you personally attend are typically your deposition — the EBT — the defence medical examination, any mediation, and trial if the case is tried. Most cases resolve without a trial.
No. You have obligations to your own insurer, including the duty to cooperate and to submit to an examination under oath where properly demanded under 11 NYCRR 65-1.1 and 65-3.5(e). You have no comparable obligation to the other side’s carrier, and a recorded statement given to an adverse adjuster becomes a document the defence can use.
You are questioned under oath with a court reporter present and your lawyer beside you. There is no judge. Your lawyer’s ability to intervene is deliberately limited: under 22 NYCRR 221.1 most objections are simply noted while you still answer, under 221.2 you may be directed not to answer only on narrow grounds such as privilege, and under 221.3 your lawyer generally cannot stop the deposition to confer with you mid-question. This is why preparation beforehand matters so much more than anything that can be done in the room.
No, and treating it as optional is dangerous. An examination under oath is your own no-fault carrier questioning you as a condition of paying benefits, before any lawsuit exists. New York courts treat a failure to appear at a properly noticed EUO as a breach of a condition precedent that vitiates coverage, and the same has been held of failing to sign and return the transcript afterward.
Because CPLR 3121 permits a defendant to require a physical examination once you have put your physical condition in issue. The examining physician is retained by the defence and will prepare a report used against your claim. You are entitled to have your attorney arrange the terms, and what you say at that examination is reportable.
It depends on the kind of case, and this changed in 2026. In an ordinary motor-vehicle case governed by Insurance Law article 51, CPLR 1411(b) now bars recovery entirely if your share of fault is greater than the defendant’s or than all defendants combined; at exactly 50% you still recover, halved. In most other injury cases — premises, construction, products, dog bites, and wrongful death — pure comparative fault under CPLR 1411(a) still applies, so your recovery is reduced by your percentage but never eliminated.
Not usually, and not all at once. The jury returns an itemised verdict under CPLR 4111 separating past from future damages. Future damages above the statutory threshold are then structured by the court under CPLR article 50-B rather than paid as a lump sum. Economic losses replaced from other sources are offset under CPLR 4545, and interest runs under CPLR 5002 and 5004. On appeal the Appellate Division can reduce the award under CPLR 5501(c) if it deviates materially from reasonable compensation.
CPLR 5003-a sets the clock. A private settling defendant must pay within 21 days of tender of a signed release and stipulation of discontinuance. A municipality or non-State-indemnified public corporation has 90 days, and the State has 90 days from the Comptroller’s determination that the papers are complete. If a defendant misses the deadline, judgment may be entered without further notice for the settlement amount plus costs, disbursements and interest from the tender date.
This page is general information. If you want it applied to your facts, the consultation is free and carries no obligation.
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